Labor Law by Mucklestone, Robert S.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 29 
Number 2 Washington Case Law-1953 
5-1-1954 
Labor Law 
Robert S. Mucklestone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert S. Mucklestone, Washington Case Law, Labor Law, 29 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 134 (1954). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol29/iss2/10 
This Washington Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW r
LABOR LAW
Union Discipline-Judicial Review of Union Declared Law. Upon
acquiring membership in a labor union, a person may gain a property
right which will be protected by the courts.' Such a property right is
found in the union member's right to work, which, because of union
security provisions between the union and various employers, may be
jeopardized once his union membership is taken from him.' Union
membership, however, carries with it certain obligations. If there is a
violation of such an obligation, the union may properly discipline the
union member even though it is an abridgement of a property right."
The standard to determine whether such an abridgement is permissible
is based on the theory that the constitution and by-laws of the union
express the terms of a contract which defines the privileges secured and
the duties assumed by those who have become members.' A violation
of such a provision followed by disciplinary action will most always be
held a permissible abridgement of the property right.'
Thus it is clear that the union may interfere with the property rights
of the members under various circumstances, but, as emphasized by
two recent Washington decisions,' the union may not interfere if in
so doing it (1) violates standards of procedural due process, or (2)
violates any procedural requirements of the organic law of the union,
or (3) incorrectly applies the substantive law of the union to the
alleged offense. In making the determination of whether the union acted
contrary to these last two requisites, what effect, if any, does the court
give to the determination made by a union tribunal?
The standards of procedural due process are always external and
such a determination is made regardless of whether the union believes
it complied with such standards.7 A requirement concomitant with such
I Mayer v. Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (Ch. 1890) ; Miller v.
Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Cf. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35,
29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1941) where it was held that a union member "has a 'property right'
in his position on the roster" of the union.
2 See James v. Marinship Corporation, 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
3 DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 17 A.C.A. 480, 175 P.2d 851
(1946), aff'd, 31 Cal.2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
4 Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
5 Dame v. Lefevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W.2d 349 (1947) ; cf. Crossen v. Duffy, 90
Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951) where the court departed from the contract
theory and held that even though there is a clear violation of a certain provision of the
by-laws, that provision itself is unenforcible.
6 Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 143 Wash. Dec. 803, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953),
rehearing granted, 144 Wash. Dec. 497 (1954), and Minch v. Local Union No. 370, Etc.,
144 Wash. Dec. 14, 265, P.2d 286 (1953).
7 Washington Local Lodge No. 104 v. Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wn.2d
1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949) (expulsion without notice, charges, or an opportunity to be
WMAY
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
standards is that the union must comply with the procedural require-
ments set forth in its constitution and by-laws.' The case of Mahoney
v. Sailors' Union of the Pacifics again emphasized that the court will
look behind the union determination of such a question. The court there
held, contrary to the union tribunal, that the determination of the
situs of a trial for disciplinary action was not done in compliance with
the procedure of.the union constitution. In Minch v. Local Union No.
370, Etc,"0 it was held proper to submit to the jury the evidence that
Minch, the union member, was expelled by less than the number of
votes required and that after the union trial and pending appeal he was
not reinstated to union membership after payment of his fine and cur-
rent dues, both in violation of the union constitutional provisions. Thus
the court in effect rejected the union's contention that the union trial
was a matter of internal discipline, not a de novo matter in the trial
court.
Likewise, the substantive questions of union law, like the compliance
with procedural requirements, will be determined by the court de novo
and the determination by the union tribunal will in no way be con-
trolling." In the Mahoney case 2 the court held that the union's find-
ings of grounds for expulsion were unfounded. "The charge being
insufficient, the proceedings based upon it was a nullity and plaintiff's
expulsion was void.. u8
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LEGAL PROFESSION
Contingent Fee Contract in Divorce Action-Disciplinary Action.
The Washington court, in In re Smith, has held that it is a violation
of the ethics of the profession for an attorney to enter into a contingent
fee contract in a divorce action. This was the first time a court had
heard enjoined); Furniture Workers' Union Local 1007 v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners, 6 Wn.2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940).
s Johnson v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170
(1930).
s 143 Wash. Dec. 803, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953), rehearing granted, 144 Wash. Dec. 497
(1954). See Wollett and Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalism-The Case of the
Sailors, 4 STAr;. L. REv. 177 (1952)
10 144 Wash. Dec. 14, 265 P.2d 286 (1953).
It Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) ; Leo v. Local Union No. 612
of Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P2d 523 (1946).
12 Supra note 8.
1s Supra note 8 at 1097.
142 Wn.2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 (1953). The agreement entered into with his client
entitled the attorney to twenty per cent of all sums which might be received by his
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